Dyson Heydon's magisterial survey of statutory reactions to equity, and equitable reactions to statute, demonstrates by its wealth of examples the complexity of the interrelationship between equity and statute. The first half of his survey illustrates how statutes may codify or amend or overlap with existing equitable doctrine, and, more interestingly, how statutes may facilitate the creation of equitable doctrine, or may in terms adopt or defer to existing equitable doctrine. The second half deals with the converse question: the response of equity to statute. A recurring theme in the modern cases is the choice between applying or otherwise drawing upon statute by analogy, or else concluding that there is no legitimate room for development, and hence following the law. One important truth is clear immediately. There can be no simple unifying analysis: the range of statutory modes of drafting (contrast the terse command that positively invites judicial creativity with the comprehensive code) and the legislative purposes and values they implement, not to mention the range of equitable doctrines, stand in the way of any such attempt. But that does not mean that the interplay between statute and equity is without interest or importance; far from it.
This commentary focusses upon a single example: the transplantation of unconscionability into statute. As Dyson Heydon points out, s 20(1) of the Australian Consumer Law provides that: "a person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is unconscionable, within the meaning of the unwritten law from time to time." This is sufficient for present purposes.
2 The basal idea is that if the norm of "unconscionability" is breached by a contract within the purview of the Act (a contract whereby work is performed, a retail lease, etc), then wide and largely discretionary statutory remedies are available.
The language of s 20(1) makes four things plain. First, as Gleeson CJ has said, 3 the reference to the unwritten law confirms that the legal meaning is the legal term, not the colloquial expression; in everyday speech, "unconscionable" may be "merely an emphatic method of expressing disapproval of someone's behaviour, but its legal meaning is considerably more precise". Statutory proscriptions against unconscionable conduct are, of course, more elaborate. Focussing on legislation applicable in New South Wales, there is s 88F of the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 (NSW) and its successors, the "unjust" contract provisions in the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) (which is "An Act with respect to the judicial review of certain contracts and the grant of relief in respect of harsh, oppressive, unconscionable or unjust contracts") and legislation based on it (such as the Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW)), and the federal legislation formerly known as the Trade Practices Act 1974 now the Competition and Consumer Act. Some of the legislation is framed upon contracts which are "unjust" or "unfair", but all expressly employ, directly or indirectly, "unconscionable": for example, a contract whereby a person performs work in an industry is "unfair" if it is "harsh, unjust or unconscionable": Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW), ss 105 and 106.
3
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 51 at [7] .
4 "(a) the relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the lessor and the lessee, and (b) whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the lessor, the lessee was required to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the lessor, and (c) whether the lessee was able to understand any documents relating to the lease, and (d) whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair tactics were used against, the lessee or a person acting on behalf of the lessee by the lessor or a person acting on behalf of the lessor in relation to the lease, and (e) the amount for which, and the circumstances under which, the lessee could have acquired an identical or equivalent lease from a person other than the lessor, and (f) the extent to which the lessors conduct towards the lessee was consistent with the lessor's conduct in similar transactions between the lessor and other like lessees, and (g) the requirements of any applicable industry code, and (h) the requirements of any other industry code, if the lessee acted on the reasonable belief that the lessor would comply with that code, and (i) the extent to which the lessor unreasonably failed to disclose to the lessee: (i) any intended conduct of the lessor that might affect the interests of the lessee, and (ii) any risks to the lessee arising from the lessor's intended conduct (being risks that the lessor should have foreseen would not be apparent to the lessee), and (j) the extent to which the lessor was willing to negotiate the terms and conditions of any lease with the lessee, and (k) the extent to which the lessor and the lessee acted in good faith." For legislators to try "to rein in the authority of the judges" by drafting statutes which seek to deal with every likely instantiation of a particular legal problem is futile, moreover, because "[t]he multiplicity of our human inventions will never attain the diversity of our cases."
On the other hand, some important statutes, perhaps especially in the United States, are very concise. The Sherman Act is perhaps the best known, but perhaps the most extreme example is the vast body of judge-made law stemming from s 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
1934
22 and rule 10b-5 made under that section. 23 Most of the law regulating insider trading is judge-made law based on that sparse language, and the succeeding eight decades have seen the rise and fall of competing theories, based either on the idea that there is a breach of trust or fiduciary obligation by the trader, or else a "misappropriation" of information.
Hence for example decisions such as Chiarell and Dirks, 24 holding that there was no contravention in the absence of (respectively) a breach of a relationship of trust and conference owed to those with whom the employee traded, and trading for the employee's personal benefit. However, more recent decisions have relied on a "misappropriation" theory.
25
There is very substantial scope for developing judge-made law where the statutory language is sparse -indeed, in a real sense, such language reflects a legislative purpose that that occur. It is striking that the uncompromising common law notions of "device, scheme or artifice to defraud", "untrue statement of a material fact" and "engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates … as a fraud or deceit upon any person" in federal laws have given rise to a body of law based very largely on equitable notions -of liability based on breach of an employee's fiduciary duty to his or her employer, and breach of confidence.
It might well be of interest to survey the extent to which sparse statutory language has been filled by equitable, as opposed to common law, principles of judge-made law.
Complete Essays (Penguin, 2003) , 1208-1210. 22 "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange … b. To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security … any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 23 "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 24 US v Chiarell 445 US 222 (1980); Dirks v SEC 463 US 646 (1983) . 25 See Carpenter v US 484 US 19 (1987) and US v O'Hagan 521 US 642 (1997) , and see R Baxt, A Black and P Hanrahan, Securities and Financial Services Law (LexisNexis, 8th ed, 2012) at 690-692.
Those considerations lead to a large question: is there anything special about the relationship between equity and statute, as opposed to other bodies of judge-made law, notably common law and statute? There is scant scope in this comment to address that in detail, but the following is offered. First, it is of course one thing to construe a statutory text, and quite another to read a court's reasons for judgment and extract principle from them. In part this is the familiar difference between the general and the particular:
26
Case law usually sets out reasons for the solution of a problem in a particular way, while statutory provisions tend to stipulate how a problem is to be negotiated in general terms.
Neil Duxbury reminds us that judicial opinions are almost always authorial (indeed, they are said to be "written") and "challenge the reader to follow and assess reasoned argument", whereas statutes (which are invariably "drafted") often comprise a series of definitions and commands, not necessarily in a sensible order. 27 Hence the force of the familiar (and often ignored) command that a court's reasons for judgment are not to be read as if they were a statute. That is particularly inappropriate in the case of equity. For example, a recurring theme in the equitable notion of unconscionability is the inability to circumscribe the circumstances in which it could be invoked. An illustration is Fullagar J's statement in
Blomley v Ryan that the circumstances "are of great variety and can hardly be satisfactorily classified" 28 and, as Kitto J's dissent in the same case illustrates, the divergent views which may be held of a "serious disadvantage" sufficiently evident to the stronger party that it is unconscientious to take advantage of it. In short, as Lord Walker has emphasised, equitable principle often requires a broad evaluative judgment after careful scrutiny of the facts, 29 and the fact that the decision-maker has invariably been a judge (as opposed to a common law jury) capable of granting relief which is discretionary and which may be on terms, is something quite different from a common law rule. Those principles may nonetheless be transplanted into statute, but to do so is quite different than, say, amending a common law rule that contributory negligence is a complete defence. [T]o treat the word "unconscionable" as having some larger meaning, derived from ordinary language, and then to seek to confine it by such concepts as high moral obloquy is to risk substituting for the statutory term language of no greater precision in an attempt to impose limits without which the Court may wander from welltrodden paths without clear criteria or guidance. That approach should not be adopted unless the statute clearly so requires."
Finally, it is hard to think of a more influential statutory incorporation of equitable doctrine than the modern appeal, which reflects the rehearing in chancery. Sir George Jessel MR explained in Re St Nazaire Company that the right of rehearing was in the nature of an appeal, and transferred to the Court of Appeal, which thereafter applied that process to all proceedings, common law, equitable, ecclesiastical and admiralty. 33 As Thesiger J said in the same case, "nothing can be clearer than that there was nothing analogous to that in the Common Law Courts". 34 Hence, as Dixon, Mason and Jacobs JJ explained, "the jurisdiction and the power of the new Court of Appeal were conferred upon it in terms derived from Chancery". 35 That appellate jurisdiction has, more than most other things, affected the legal systems of the United Kingdom and Australia, creating the familiar coherent bodies of law which in large measure we take for granted in the 21 st century.
